

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 OMB-01

AEC-11 AECE-00 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W  
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P R 091922Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2416

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 3195

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: PRESS CONFERENCE BY POLISH  
REP, APRIL 9, 1974

SUMMARY: WITH ABOUT 30 MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES  
ATTENDING, POLISH REP STRULAK, PRESENTED PRESS  
STATEMENT FOR EAST ON APRIL 9. STRULAK FOCUSSED  
ON THE GOOD WORKING ATMOSPHERE, ON THE ADVANTAGES  
OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION PLAN, AND EMPHASIZED  
THE NEED TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ANY AGREE-  
MENT. STRULAK REJECTED, IN THE NAME OF THE  
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, THE WESTERN CONTENTION THAT  
THERE IS A GROUND FORCE DISPARITY AS BEING  
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"COMPLETELY ARTIFICIAL AND THEREFORE UNTRUE." HE

AGREED THAT THE "COMPLEXITY" OF THE SUBJECT MATTER IN VIENNA MADE THE EXISTENCE OF "DIFFICULTIES" NOT SURPRISING. IN CONCLUSION HE CALLED FOR REFLECTION DURING THE RECESS SO THAT ALL COULD PREPARE THEMSELVES "FOR EVEN MORE PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS." IN THE QS-AND-AS STRULAK DENIED THAT THE SOCIALIST STATES WERE MORE INTERESTED IN THE REDUCTION OF THE BUNDESWEHR THAN OF THE US FORCES, AND CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THAT ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN THE FINAL INSTANCE ARE ONLY THE BY-PRODUCT OF AGREED REDUCTIONS, GINGERLY DANCED AROUND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT BY 1975, ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO THE QUESTION CEILINGS, BUT MADE CLEAR THAT THE EASTERN CONCEPT IS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THE WEST ENVISAGES IN THAT RESPECT. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT OF STRULAK PRESS STATEMENT.

1. I HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE CONCLUSION TODAY OF A THREE-MONTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IS THE RIGHT OCCASION TO MEET YOU AGAIN AND SHARE WITH YOU SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE PROGRESS OF THE VIENNA TALKS.

2. LET ME SAY, AT THE VERY OUTSET, THAT THIS HAS BEEN AN INTERESTING PERIOD, CHARACTERIZED BY AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF TOPICS PERTAINING TO THE PROBLEM OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE PARTIES HAVE BEEN EXPLAINING THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS AS WELL AS EXPLORING, IN SUFFICIENTLY GREAT DETAIL, EACH OTHER'S VIEWS.

3. THE USEFULNESS OF SUCH MUTUAL EXPLORATION HAS BEEN GENERALLY APPRECIATED BY THE PARTICIPANTS. ONE MAY HAVE A LEGITIMATE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE HELPFUL IN FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS.

4. INDEED, A CERTAIN DEGREE OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF PARTICULAR ASPECTS HAS BEEN REVEALED. THUS THE NEED OF AGREEING ON EARLY REDUCTION STEPS HAS BEEN A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION. ALSO COMMON

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HAVE BEEN THE REFERENCE TO THE IMPORTANCE OF REDUCTIONS FOR PROMOTING STABILITY, SECURITY, PEACE AND DETENTE IN EUROPE, AS WELL AS THE STRESS ON THE REQUIREMENT TO RESPECT THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE PARTIES. THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES ALSO SEEM TO CONCUR IN ACKNOWLEDGING THAT, IN MILITARY TERMS, EACH OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WESTERN AND THE SOCIALIST STATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION ARE OF IMPORTANCE, THERE BEING A CLOSE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM.

5. THE POLISH DELEGATION AS WELL AS OTHER SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS AND - I PRESUME - ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS ARE SATISFIED THAT THE LIKE AND THE SPIRIT AMONG THE DELEGATES -FRIENDLY. THIS CONSTANTLY GOOD ATMOSPHERE, LITTLE IMPRESSIVE AS IT MAY APPEAR TO OUTSIDERS, IS CERTAINLY NO SMALL ASSET OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS A FIRM CONVICTION OF THE POLISH DELEGATION THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH CLIMATE OF TALKS REACHES BEYOND VIENNA. IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE WIDER CLIMATE OF EUROPEAN AND WORLD DETENTE.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS GOOD ATMOSPHERE WILL BE OF DEFINITE HELP IN OVERCOMING THE DIFFICULTIES IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

7. OF COURSE, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE AS WELL AS WRONG NOT TO SPEAK ABOUT THE EXISTING DIFFICULTIES. I FEEL IT WORTH TELLING YOU HOW WE LOOK UPON THESE DIFFICULTIES. I TAKE THE LIBERTY TO DO SO BECAUSE THESE ARE PROBLEMS LARGELY AND DAILY DISCUSSED BY THE PRESS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY ARE CLOSELY RELATED TO SOME IDEAS AND BROADER CONCEPTS THAT HAVE RECENTLY ACQUIRED CONSIDERABLE CURRENCY IN THE WESTERN PRESS.

8. ONE SUCH CONCEPT IS THE INSISTENCE BY WESTERN QUARTERS ON THE ALLEGED DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES - WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO RESULT IN A DISADVANTAGEOUS NATO SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

9. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN REJECTING THIS CONTENTION AS COMPLETELY ARTIFICIAL AND THEREFORE UNTRUE. I HAVE ALREADY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO STATE POLISH VIEWS ON THE ISSUE BEFORE THE PRESS. ONE CANNOT DRAW CONCLUSIONS ABOUT DISPARITY OR ABOUT PARITY BY FOCUSING ATTENTION ON A SINGLE ELEMENT OF THE COMPLEX MILITARY SET-UP

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IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE, BY PUBLICIZING ARBITRARILY SELECTED AND, THEREFORE, DISTORTED FIGURES. IN THIS CONNECTION I SHALL REPEAT AGAIN THE OBVIOUS TRUISM THAT COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF ARMED FORCES, WHETHER NATIONAL OR FOREIGN, ARE MEASURED WITH DUE REGARD TO ALL THEIR COMPONENT PARTS. THEREFORE ONE CANNOT CONSTRUCT VIABLE AND REALISTIC CONCEPT OF REDUCTION ON THE BASIS OF AN ISOLATED ELEMENT OF THE WHOLE. YET SUCH A CONCEPT HAS BEEN PRESENTED AND CONSISTENTLY UPHELD IN THE FORM OF THE WESTERN DEMAND FOR THE SO-CALLED COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES OF THE NATO AND SOCIALIST STATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION.

10. THIS CONCEPT IN MY VIEW IS HIGHLY DEFICIENT AND INEQUITABLE. BY CONCENTRATING ON GROUND FORCES ALONE AND LEAVING ASIDE

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P R 091922Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2417

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

SUCH POTENT FORCES AND WEAPON SYSTEMS AS THE NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES, BY PROVIDING FOR DISPROPORTIONATELY GREATER REDUCTIONS ON THE PART OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, IT CLEARLY AIMS AT GIVING THE WESTERN STATES ONE-SIDED MILITARY ADVANTAGES. YOU MAY WELL UNDERSTAND THAT SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, POLAND INCLUDED, CANNOT APPROVE THE REDUCTION PROPOSAL SO CONCEIVED. AS OPPOSITE TO THIS, IN OUR APPROACH WE ENVISAGE LOWER CEILINGS OF ARMED FORCES, BUT THE ONES THAT WOULD PRESERVE THE STABLE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA. YOU MUST BE FAMILIAR WITH QUITE A NUMBER OF PRONOUNCEMENTS BY PROMINENT POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS OF THE WEST TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE EXISTS SUCH STABLE RELATIONSHIP AND THAT IT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

11. ANOTHER THEORY RECENTLY GIVEN PUBLICITY IN THE WEST

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PROCEEDS FROM THE ASSERTION THAT AN ARMED CONFLICT IN CENTRAL EUROPE CAN BE STARTED ONLY THROUGH THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS - WARHEADS AND THEIR LAUNCHERS, MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT, CONCENTRATED IN THE AREA, ARE SUPPOSEDLY ALMOST OF NO HARM TO ANYONE, NOT CAPABLE TO START A CONFLICT.

12. THIS OPINION IS CLEARLY SUBSERVIENT TO THE THEORY OF DISPARITIES AND TO THE WESTERN INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES AS A REFLECTION OF A DESIRED MILITARY "PARITY" IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, IT HAS NO FOUNDATION IN REALITY. IT CANNOT AND IT WILL NOT WEAKEN THE WIDESPREAD AND WELL-FOUNDED CONCERN OF THE EUROPEAN PEOPLES ABOUT THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONCENTRATED IN THE HEART OF THE CONTINENT. IT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AS VALID IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THE EXCLUSION FROM REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WELL AS THE AIR FORCES OPENS UP THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR GROWTH, WHICH WOULD MAKE VOID A REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

13. YET ANOTHER DIFFICULTY WHICH I SHOULD CALL CRUCIAL IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS THE QUESTION OF ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE FORTHCOMING REDUCTIONS. THIS ISSUE IS DIRECTLY PERTINENT TO THE ENVISAGED RESULTS OF MILITARY DETENTE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS WELL AS TO THE EARLIER AGREEMENT ON PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS.

14. YOU CANNOT EXPECT TWO POWERS -THE USA AND THE USSR, HOWEVER GREAT IS THEIR ROLE, TO SUBSTITUTE THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMIES FOR A PROCESS OF MILITARY DETENTE IN THE AREA.

15. SUCH PROCESS LOGICALLY AND ALSO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ALREADY REACHED UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE SPECIFIC GROUP OF ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD INVOLVE ALL OF THEM FROM THE BEGINNING. YET, SAVE THE UNITED STATES, NOT OTHER DIRECT WESTERN PARTICIPANT HAS SPELLED OUT CONCRETELY ENOUGH HIS READINESS TO TAKE PART IN THE REDUCTIONS.

16. YOU MAY WELL UNDERSTAND THAT POLAND AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CAN HARDLY VIEW AS PRODUCTIVE A REDUCTION AGREEMENT CHARACTERIZED BY SUCH STRIKING LOOPHOLES AS LACK OF ASSURANCES CONCERNING THE COVERAGE OF ALL ARMIES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING

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SOME OF THE LARGEST ONES, AND OF ALL MAJOR KINDS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING SUCH POWERFUL AND DANGEROUS ONES AS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND COMBAT AIRCRAFT.

17. YOUR NATURAL QUESTION TO MY PORTRAYAL OF THE DIFFICULTIES  
WOULD BE: WHAT ANSWER SHOULD WE HAVE TO THEM?

18. TO THIS I MIGHT SAY THAT THE EASIEST AND THE FULLEST ANSWER  
WOULD BE TO REFER YOU TO THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973,  
SPONSORED BY CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR, SOVIET UNION AND POLAND. INDEED,  
THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE PAST THREE MONTHS HAVE CONVINCED US THAT  
THANKS TO THE COMPREHENSIVE NATURE AND THE EQUITY OF THE PROPOSED  
METHOD OF REDUCTIONS WHICH TAKES SCRUPULOUSLY INTO ACCOUNT  
THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES - THIS DRAFT HAS IN OUR  
VIEW, REMAINED THE PROPER BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. IT DOES NOT  
DEMAND UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS FROM ANY PARTY JUST AS IT DOES  
NOT GIVE ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGES TO ANY ONE. IT OFFERS REALISTIC  
AND JUST SOLUTIONS.

19. AMONG ITS PROVISIONS ONE MAY FIND THOSE THAT RENDER POS-  
SIBLE A QUICK START OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS WITHOUT GREAT  
DIFFICULTIES BUT WITH CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL EFFECT.

20. IF I HAVE STRESSED THE HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL POINTS IN THE  
WESTERN PLATFORM WHICH, IN OUR OPINION, TEND TO AFFECT OUR  
SECURITY INTERESTS, IT IS BECAUSE I WANT YOU TO UNDERSTAND  
THAT THESE ARE REAL OBSTACLES ON THE WAY TO UNDERSTANDING.  
NEITHER POLAND NOR ANY OF HER ALLIES WOULD ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT  
WHICH MAY DETRACT FROM THEIR SECURITY. ON THE OTHER HAND  
WE STAND PREPARED TO DO OUR BEST, TO EXTEND ALL POSSIBLE CO-  
OPERATION IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT AN EARLY AGREEMENT WHICH,  
WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES CON-  
CERNED, WILL LOWER THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN THE SENSITIVE  
AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE, WILL SAVE THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL EUROPE  
MEANS FOR MORE PROFITABLE SPENDING, WILL BRING US CLOSER TO THE  
AGREED OBJECTIVE OF BETTER STABILITY, STRONGER SECURITY AND PEACE  
IN EUROPE.

21. GIVEN THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SUBJECT OF THE VIENNA TALKS,  
DIFFICULTIES ARE NOT SURPRISING. WHAT REALLY MATTERS IS THE  
WILL, A MUTUAL WILL TO OVERCOME THEM.

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22. WE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT THE COMING RECESS IN THESE TALKS  
WILL BE AN OCCASION TO REFLECT UPON THE WELL-EXPLORED ATTITUDES  
AND PREPARE OURSELVES FOR EVEN MORE PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.  
END TEXT OF STRULAK PRESS STATEMENT.

BEGIN TEXT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

23. Q. (LOS ANGELES TIMES) WHILE I WILL ADMIT THAT THERE IS A CERTAIN

LOGIC IN YOUR PRESENTATION CONCERNING THE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF ARMS, IS IT THE POSITION OF POLAND AND OF THE SOCIALIST STATES THAT THIS HAS TO BE ONE VAST PACKAGE, INCLUDING EVERYTHING FROM RIFLES UP TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BEFORE ANYTHING CAN HAPPEN?

A. WELL, I WILL DIVIDE MY ANSWER TO YOU IN TWO PARTS, BECAUSE THE WORD

"PACKAGE" YOU USED HAS VARIOUS MEANINGS. IF YOU CONCEIVE OF THE PACKAGE

AS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, THAT YOU ARE NEGOTIATING ABOUT REDUCTIONS

OF EVERYTHING THAT IS IN THE ZONE, THAT MEANS ALL THE ARMIES OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, AND ALL THE OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. IF WE UNDERSTAND THE "PACKAGE" AS SUCH-YES, WE STAND FOR SUCH COMPREHENSIVE REDUCTIONS. BUT OF COURSE, PACKAGE HAS

ALSO A TECHNICAL CONNOTATION, AND NATURALLY THERE IS A QUESTION OF WHERE YOU START. I CAN VERY WELL IMAGINE THAT IN A  
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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2418  
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFOR USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

27. Q. (AP) AND THE TWO SETS OF PROPOSALS ARE STILL IDENTICAL? THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE, NO MOVING TOGETHER, NO MEETING OF THE MINDS?

A. WELL, I THINK THAT I WOULD STAND BY THE REPLY THAT I MADE EARLIER.

28. Q. (REUTERS) MR. AMBASSADOR- TWO QUESTIONS: FIRSTLY, WHAT IS YOUR IMPRESSION OF THE INFORMAL CONTACTS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS AND WHAT USE ARE THEY, AND SECONDLY, I THINK YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR STATEMENT THAT THE WARSAW PACT STATES WOULD ACCEPT THE IDEA OF ACCEPTING SOME SORT OF CEILING IN AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT. COULD YOU TELL US EXACTLY WHAT YOU MEAN BY THAT, WHAT SORT OF CEILING?

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A. WELL, FIRST THE INFORMAL MEETINGS; IT IS QUITE NATURAL WHEN YOU HAVE 19 DELEGATIONS GATHERED THAT YOU FIND THAT THEY SHOW ACTIVE INTEREST, AS THEY DO HERE, IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT AND COMMON POINTS. IT IS NATURAL THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE EXCHANGES IN VARIOUS FORMS. JUST AS THE PLENARY MEETINGS HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN HAVING AN EXPOSITION OF VIEWS, SO ALSO THE INFORMAL MEETINGS HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IN EXCHANGING VARIOUS VIEWS, AND IN HAVING DISCUSSIONS AND CLARIFYING VARIOUS POINTS, AND ALSO IN TRYING TO FIND WHAT MAY BE COMMON IN THE ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES. AND I THINK THAT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE GOOD ATMOSPHERE THAT I REFERRED TO. THIS WAY THEY SHOULD BE EVALUATED IN A VERY POSITIVE MANNER.

AH YES, THE SECOND PROBLEM, THE CEILINGS. YES, OF COURSE YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE PRINCIPAL POINTS OF OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT, AND I THINK IT IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS OF OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD HAVE CEILINGS. OTHERWISE IT IS DIFFICULT TO SPEAK OF THE VALIDITY OF AN AGREEMENT. AND ALSO IT IS NATURAL THAT WE ARE SUPPOSED TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT WITH LOWER CEILINGS. THE DIFFERENCE, HOWEVER, BETWEEN THIS IDEA OF CEILINGS, LOWER CEILINGS AND COMMON CEILING, IS THAT WE SHOULD ARRIVE AT THE CEILING SO THAT IT DOES NOT MEAN HARM TO THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY. IT SHOULD PRESERVE STABILITY, DEVELOP STRENGTH AND STABILITY. WE ARGUE THAT STABILITY EXISTS, AND IT IS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING STABILITY THAT THE LOWER CEILINGS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED.

29. Q. (NEW YORK TIMES) SIR, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE TIME-TABLE OF THE TALKS IS SUCH THAT YOU COULD BEGIN SOME REDUCTIONS IN 1975, AS WAS MENTIONED AT A PREVIOUS OCCASION OF THIS TYPE?

A. I THINK THAT IS THE STATED INTENTION OF PRACTICALLY ALL THE PARTIES. THEY SHOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN EARLY AGREEMENT, THEY SHOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT, IF POSSIBLE, BY '75, AND IF WE PROCEED



WITH ALL DUE CARE FOR EACH OTHER'S POSITION AND WORK INTENSIVELY,  
AS WE INTEND TO, I THINK WE CAN HAVE SUCH AN AGREEMENT. (TECHNICAL  
FOLLOW-UP QUESTION ON THAT: HOW WOULD YOU ENVISAGE THE WORK THE  
REST OF THE YEAR? DO YOU EXPECT THAT  
THERE WOULD BE SUMMER SESSIONS HERE, OR WILL YOU TAKE A LONG RECESS?)  
IT IS MUCH TOO EARLY TO SPEAK ABOUT IT YET. YOU KNOW THAT WE  
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ARE RECONVENING IN MAY, AND THERE IS NO CLEAR IDEA HOW LONG  
WE SHALL PROCEED. I SHOULD RATHER SAY THAT WE MEASURE USUALLY THE  
TEMPO OF THE RATE OF OUR WORK BY THE REQUIREMENT OF THE WORK.  
THERE IS NO ARTIFICIAL TIMETABLE, NOR LIMITS. WE RATHER COORDINATE  
THE PROCEDURES AND RECESSES ACCORDING WITH THE MERIT OF OUR DIS-  
CUSSIONS, WHICH IS THE ONLY CORRECT POSITION TO TAKE IN A SERIOUS  
APPROACH.

30. Q. AMBASSADOR STRULAK, DO YOU HAVE FIXED A DATE FOR YOUR NEXT  
MEETING?

A. NO, I THINK YOU KNOW THAT THE TALKS START IN THE WEEK BEGINNING  
THE 6TH OF MAY.

31. Q. (BBC) MR. AMBASSADOR, WOULD IT BE CORRECT TO ASSUME THAT  
FROM THE WARSAW PACT POINT OF VIEW IT IS MORE ESSENTIAL TO  
ACHIEVE A REDUCTION IN THE BUNDESWEHR AS THE LARGEST COMPONENT IN  
NATO, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN TO SECURE A REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES IN  
EUROPE?

A. WELL, THERE IS NO SIMPLE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION, BECAUSE AS I  
HAVE STRESSED IN ONE OF MY OTHER REPLIES, IN MY STATEMENT, THE  
CRUCIAL QUESTION FOR OUR COUNTRIES, FOR POLAND, IS THE REDUCTION  
BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. AND THE BUNDESWEHR BEING THE LARGEST  
SINGLE  
ARMY, AS I SAID, ON THE NATO SIDE, IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT WE  
ENVISAGE ITS INCLUSION, AND THAT ITS INCLUSION IS ESSENTIAL. HOW-  
EVER, I SHOULD SAY THAT OUR APPROACH IS EVEN-HANDED, WE DO NOT  
STRESS IN PARTICULAR THAT WE WOULD HAVE ONE FORCE REDUCED MORE  
THAN THE OTHERS, THIS IS LOGICAL, AND POSSIBLE TO A CERTAIN  
DEGREE.

32. MR. AMBASSADOR, DO THE WARSAW PACT STATES SEE ANY LINK, DIRECT  
OR INDIRECT, BETWEEN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER EAST-WEST NEGO-  
TIATIONS GOING ON?

A. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SPEAK ABOUT A DIRECT LINK, OURS ARE  
QUITE PECULIAR NEGOTIATIONS, DEVOTED TO A SPECIAL SUBJECT, AND ALL  
THE PARTICIPANTS REGARD THESE TALKS AS SEPARATE. WE HAVE OUR  
OWN TEMPO, AS HAVE THE OTHERS, AND THEY CONCENTRATE ON OTHER SUB-  
JECTS. HOWEVER, IT IS WELL UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS  
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ARE BEING HELD WITHIN A WIDER PROCESS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, WHICH COMPRISES BI-LATERAL RELATIONS, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION, ALL-EUROPEAN RELATIONS, AND OF COURSE IF PROGRESS IS REGISTERED IN ANY OTHER FORM OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, IT CAN ONLY BENEFIT THE PROGRESS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. JUST AS THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE.

33. Q. (VOA) MR. AMBASSADOR, I SEE NO REFERENCE IN YOUR STATEMENT TO "ASSOCIATED MEASURES". NOW DOES THIS MEAN THAT THIS QUESTION IS NOT UNDER DISCUSSION BY THE DELEGATES?

A. WELL, AS YOU KNOW, ASSOCIATED MEASURES ARE PART OF THE SUBJECT OF THE DISCUSSIONS. THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER IS MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENT AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HOWEVER, IT IS LOGICAL IN MY MIND, IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE, THAT THEY ARE TO ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS, AND THAT FIRST THE MAIN PROBLEM OF REDUCTIONS HAS TO BE DISCUSSED, THEN THE ASSOCIATED MEASURES. THAT IS WHY I DID NOT FOCUS ON THAT. BUT OF COURSE THERE IS AN IDEA OF HAVING SOME MEASURES WHICH WILL BE CONNECTED WITH THE REDUCTION PROCESS.

END TEXT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. HUMES

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## Message Attributes

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